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James Lomas, Jessica Ochalek and Mike Paulden
Accounting for Timing when Assessing
Health-Related Policies
Abstract: The primary focus of this paper is to offer guidance on the analysis of
time streams of effects that a project may have so that they can be discounted appro-
priately. This requires a framework that identifies the common parameters that
need to be assessed, whether conducting cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analy-
sis. The quantification and conversion of the time streams of different effects into
their equivalent health, health care cost or consumption effects avoids embedding
multiple arguments in discounting policies. This helps to identify where parameters
are likely to differ in particular contexts, what type of evidence would be relevant,
what is currently known and how this evidence might be strengthened. The current
evidence available to support the assessment of the key parameters is discussed and
possible estimates and default assumptions are suggested. Reporting the results in
an extensive way is recommended. This makes the assessments required explicit
so the impact of alternative assumptions can be explored and analysis updated as
better estimates evolve. Some projects will have effects across different countries
where some or all of these parameters will differ. Therefore, the net present value
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of a project will be the sum of the country specific net present values rather than
the sum of effects across countries discounted at some common rate.
Keywords: Health.
JEL classifications: I1; O1; O2.
1 Introduction
A decision to introduce a policy (e.g., public health, educational, environmental
etc.) or implement a project (e.g., a health technology or programme of care for a
particular indication) may offer some immediate health benefits for the current pop-
ulation but, in many circumstances, the health benefits will occur in future periods.
Other projects are intended to reduce the risk of future events for the current pop-
ulation and/or reduce risks for future incident patients, so the health benefits they
offer will not be fully realized for many years. Future benefits are not restricted
to health but may also include impacts on private consumption, changes in future
health care costs and other forms of public expenditure as well as social objectives
of particular interest to the decision maker. Similarly, different policy choices and
projects will not just impose health care and other costs in the current period but in
future periods as well.
The question is how account should be taken of when health care and other
costs are incurred and health and other benefits are received. The intention is to
offer clarity about principles, the key parameters required and the evidence cur-
rently available to inform assessments of them, so that decision makers in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs) and other stakeholders, are better placed to
judge what would be an appropriate analysis of the time streams of the effects that
a project may have and the discount policy to apply to them in a particular con-
text. This includes how global bodies, which make recommendations (e.g., World
Health Organisation), purchase health technologies (e.g., Global Fund) or prioritize
the development of new ones (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), should
judge the value of projects which have effects in many different settings where
appropriate discounting of costs and benefits are likely to differ.
The primary focus of this paper is to offer guidance on the appropriate anal-
ysis of time streams of the effects that a project may have (i.e., on health, health
care costs and consumption) so that they can then be discounted appropriately. This
requires a framework within which cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and benefit-
cost analysis (BCA) can be understood and that identifies the common key param-
eters that need to be assessed. This helps to identify where parameters are likely to
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differ in particular contexts, what type of evidence would be relevant to inform their
assessment, what is currently known that is relevant to low- and middle-income
settings and how this evidence might be strengthened. This also makes the assess-
ments and unavoidable judgements required explicit so the impact of alternative
assumptions can be explored and analysis updated as better estimates evolve.
A common conceptual framework of how time streams of effects on health,
health care costs and consumption may be considered is set out in Section 2. This
identifies the key parameters that need to be assessed, whether conducting BCA or
CEA. The evidence currently available that might support their assessment in LMIC
settings is discussed in Section 3 and possible estimates and default assumptions
are suggested. These are summarized in Section 4 before suggesting how analysis
might be most usefully reported, especially when a project has effects across dif-
ferent contexts where parameters are likely to differ. Finally, some suggestions of
priorities for further research are made.
2 Conceptual framework
A common conceptual framework within which CEA and BCA can be understood
and key parameters identified is initially set out for a project that only has effects
on time streams of health and health care costs. This is extended to consider effects
beyond health and health care costs, where the often complex reality of multiple
sectors is initially simplified into two (collective health care expenditure and pri-
vate consumption) to illustrate principles. The common parameters that need to be
assessed are identified and the distinction between BCA and CEA is discussed.
2.1 The objective of the project is to improve health
Decision-making bodies and institutions can be viewed as the agents of a principal
(e.g., a socially legitimate process such as government) which allocates resources,
devolves powers and gives responsibility to pursue specific, measurable and there-
fore narrowly defined objectives, e.g., to improve health. The values implied by the
outcome of this process (e.g., government implicitly or explicitly determining col-
lective expenditure on health care) can be regarded as a partial but revealed expres-
sion of some unknown social welfare function that may include many conflicting
arguments, e.g., health equity, social solidarity among many others that are diffi-
cult to specify let alone quantify (Drummond et al., 2015). In these circumstances
economic analysis cannot be used to make claims about social welfare or the opti-
mality of the resources allocated to health care. Its role is more modest, claiming to
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inform accountable decision-making by revealing implied values and exposing the
implications of current levels of health and other public expenditure. It is this role
that economic analysis has tended to play in health policy and underpins much of
the evaluation of health care projects and CEAs that have been conducted (Drum-
mond et al., 2015; Coast et al., 2008).1
2.1.1 Why discount health?
In this context the reason to discount future health effects cannot appeal to the type
of welfare arguments that underpin social time preference for consumption, but
instead to the opportunity costs of financing health care. The health care costs of a
project could have been invested elsewhere in the economy or used to reduce public
borrowing at a real rate of return, which would provide more health care resources
in the future and generate greater health benefits. Health care transforms resources
into health so from the perspective of a social planner trading health care resources
over time is to trade health. Therefore, if health care costs are discounted to reflect
the opportunity cost of financing health care, their health effects must also be dis-
counted.2 For example, real yields on government bonds reflect the marginal cost
of increasing health care expenditure available to government (Paulden & Claxton,
2012; Paulden et al., 2016). In this context, the broader question of the social oppor-
tunity costs of public expenditure including the macroeconomic choice of levels and
mix of taxation and borrowing can be regarded as the responsibility of government
rather than spending departments or national and supranational decision-making
and advisory bodies.3
2.1.2 Representing the effects of projects
Estimates of the additional health care costs (1ch) and additional health effects
(1h) of a project whether measured as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained
or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) averted are commonly reported as incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs).4 These provide a useful summary of how
1 See Drummond et al. (2015, Section 2.4.3, pp. 33–38).
2 This is commonly illustrated by a comparison of terminal and present values. The cost per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) of a project with immediate costs and additional health benefits all occurring
at a future point in time is the same whether costs are expressed at their terminal value when the health
benefits occur, or discounting the health benefits back to their present value at the same rate (Nord,
2011).
3 See Drummond et al. (2015) page 108–112.
4 See Drummond et al. (2015), Section 2.4.1, pp. 27–31 and Section 4.2.1, pp. 79–83.
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much additional resource is required to achieve a measured improvement in health
(the additional cost per QALY gained or DALY averted). Whether the intervention
will improve health outcomes overall requires a comparison with a “threshold” (kh)
that reflects the likely health opportunity costs, i.e., the improvement in health that
would have been possible if the additional resources required had, instead, been
made available for other health care activities. A project will improve health over-
all if the additional health benefits exceed the health opportunity costs associated
with the additional health care costs that must be found from existing commitments,
or that require additional expenditure that could have been devoted to other health
care activities (1h > 1ch/kh).
5
Time stream of net health effects
Most projects offer time streams of health effects (1ht ) and health care costs
(1cht ) illustrated in Table 1. The additional health care costs in each period can
be reported as the health opportunity costs (1cht/kht , in column (5) of Table 1)
by applying a “threshold” that reflects an assessment of the marginal productivity
of health care expenditure relevant to that period (kht ). The time streams of health
benefits and health opportunity losses can then be discounted at a rate which reflects
a social time preference for health (rh).
The social choice of how much resource to devote to health care over time and
the resulting health in each period reveals something about society’s willingness to
trade current and future health. For example, the choice of the principal in setting
the level of health expenditure in each period, based on expectations about how the
marginal productivity of health care expenditure is likely to evolve, implies values
for kht . Therefore, a revealed social time preference for health
6 can be based on the
rate at which the principal can borrow or save (rs) and whether the “threshold” is
expected to grow (gkh) because this indicates the relative value (in terms of health
care resources) of current compared to future health (rh = rs − gkh) (Paulden &
Claxton, 2012; Paulden et al., 2016).
Time stream of equivalent health care resources
Rather than represent the additional health care costs of the project as health
opportunity losses, the health benefits can be valued as the additional health care
resources which would have been required to deliver similar health benefits in that
period by applying the relevant “threshold” to the health benefits (kht ·1ht in col-
umn 7). The time streams of equivalent health care resource benefits and costs can
5 This is equivalent to asking whether the cost per QALY the policy offers is less than the cost-
effectiveness “threshold” (1ch/1h < kh), so long as the “threshold” used to judge cost-effectiveness
reflects the likely health opportunity costs.
6 This is the time preference for health, as distinct from pure time preference (for utility) or social rate
of time preference (SRTP) for consumption.
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then be discounted at a rate which reflects the opportunity cost, faced by the princi-
pal, of increasing public health care expenditure, rs , (e.g., real yields on government
bonds).
Reporting cost-effectiveness ratios
Most cost-effectiveness analyses of health care projects report ICERs rather
than net health benefits (column 4–5) or the equivalent net effect on health care
resources (column 6–7) (Phelps & Mushlin, 1991; Stinnett & Mullahy, 1998). An
ICER (1ch/1h) must be compared to a single “threshold” relevant to the current
period (kh1). However, some account must be taken of expected changes in health
opportunity costs. For example, if the cost-effectiveness “threshold” is expected to
grow in real terms (gkh > 0), because the marginal productivity of health care
expenditure is expected to decline (e.g., due to real growth in health expenditure),
then future costs are less important because they will displace less health, or addi-
tional resources could deliver less health (Paulden et al., 2017). Therefore, reporting
ICERs requires discounting the additional health care costs at a rate that accounts
for any growth in the “threshold”, to reflect the relative importance of future costs
(rh + gkh).
7 This differential or dual discounting reflects expected changes in the
marginal productivity of health care expenditure as well as time preference for
health (Claxton et al., 2011).
The widespread reporting of ICERs in CEA may reflect reluctance on the part
of decision-making and advisory bodies to be explicit about how much health care
systems can afford to pay to improve health and how this is likely to evolve over
time. Until recently there has also been a lack of evidence about the likely health
opportunity costs (Culyer et al., 2007). As a consequence implicit assessments have
been embedded in how costs and health effects are discounted. This has contributed
to a lack of clarity about discounting policy, what a cost-effectiveness “threshold”
ought to represent and how it might be informed with evidence.
One key recommendation is that this and other forms of dual discounting
should be avoided (see Section 4.2). Although ICERs might be a familiar and
useful summary, the primary analysis should report time streams of health benefits
and health care costs (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1), and their transformation into
streams of health effects (columns 4 and 5 in Table 1) and streams of equivalent
health care resources (columns 6 and 7 in Table 1) based on an explicit assessment
of health opportunity costs.
Time stream of equivalent consumption effects
The health effects of the project in columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 can also
be expressed as the equivalent consumption value of the health benefits (Vht ·1ht ,
7 This approximation is based on the plausible assumption that rh and gk are small.
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column 8) and the heath opportunity losses (Vht (1cht/kht , column 9)) in each time
period. This requires some assessment of the consumption value of health (Vht )
and how it is likely to evolve over time. However, in this example, where there
are only effects on health and health care costs, or where the social planner has
decided that other effects should be set aside when considering this type of health
care project,8 Vht does not influence the decision because it simply rescales any
net health benefit or net health loss (both sides of 1h > 1ch/kh are multiplied by
Vht ). Since kht and Vht cannot be assumed to be necessarily and always equal (see
Section 3.4 for discussion of the reasoning and empirical evidence that suggests kht
< Vht ) health care costs cannot be treated as if they are private consumption costs
and vice versa.
A “threshold” that reflects an assessment of health opportunity costs is nec-
essary when comparing different health care projects competing for limited health
care resources. However, it is also relevant when considering broader questions of
whether public resources available for health care should be increased. For exam-
ple, it helps to inform: (i) whether there may be a case for increasing health expen-
diture because kht < Vht so some projects are rejected that would have offered
net social benefits if total health expenditure was increased and (ii) how much of
an increase in expenditure should be considered.9 It would be better to evaluate
projects founded on an empirically based assessment of kht and Vht and how they
are expected to evolve, rather than assume that public finances will be immediately
set to accommodate the project being evaluated.
2.1.3 Nonhealth impacts and nonhealth care costs
Projects often impose costs or offer benefits beyond measures of health and health
care expenditure. For example, there may be out of pocket costs and/or net produc-
tion effects of improved survival and quality of life (e.g., Meltzer, 2013) as well
8 There are reasons to set aside explicit and quantitative consideration of other effects if they are likely
to conflict with other important social arguments that are difficult to specify, let alone quantify, e.g.,
equity and the benefits of social solidarity offered by collectively funded health care. This is the explicit
decision that has been taken in the UK by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence after
considering the benefits and potential costs of quantifying these wider effects in the decision-making
process (Claxton et al., 2015b).
9 The welfare losses associated with socially acceptable forms of taxation means it costs more than
one private dollar to raise one public dollar. This marginal cost of public funds means it is unlikely
that public health expenditure would be increased to the point where kht = Vht · Vh/kh indicates the
value of public health expenditure relative to private consumption, or the shadow price of public health
expenditure (see Section 3.4), which, if greater than an assessment of the marginal cost of public funds
(e.g., 1.3 to 1.5), would suggest that health expenditure should be increased.
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Table 2a Reporting the effects of a project on health, health care costs and consumption.
Effects of the project Effects on
health
Effects on
consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time Additional
health
benefits
Additional
health care
costs
Consumption
costs
Net health
benefits
Net consumption
costs
1 1h1 1ch1 1cc1 1h1 −1ch1/kh1 1cc1 + kc1 ·1ch1
— — — — — —
t 1ht 1cht 1cct 1ht −1cht/kht 1cct + kct ·1cht
— — — — — —
T 1hT 1chT 1ccT 1hT −1chT /khT 1ccT + kcT ·1chT
as impacts on other social objectives. Other types of project may have health and
other effects but might not impose health care costs (e.g., nutrition, educational and
environmental projects). Therefore, some assessment of how other types of benefits
and costs should be traded against health and health care cost is required.
A project which has effects on health and health care costs but also imposes
costs on private consumption (1cct ), or offers private consumption benefits (when
1cct < 0), is illustrated in Table 2a. The time stream of health benefits net of the
health opportunity losses in column 5 combines the health benefits and additional
health care costs of the project. The net effect on consumption (in column 6) is
the consumption costs (column 4) net of the impact on consumption of the health
opportunity losses associated with the additional health care costs of the project.
Therefore, once other effects beyond health and health care costs are included, some
assessment of the consumption opportunity costs of the additional health care costs
(kct ) is also required
10. The net effects of the project can then be reported as two
time streams of net health and net consumption effects (columns 5 and 6).11
10 If there are consumption effects of changes in health there will also be consumption opportunity costs
due to the health opportunity losses associated with health care costs of the project. If these consumption
effects run only through the health effects of health expenditure, then kc will reflect the consumption
effects of changes in health. Insofar as health expenditure has a positive impact on economic growth
compared to other forms of public expenditure then restricting attention to the consumption effects of
changes in health may underestimate the consumption opportunity costs of health care expenditure (see
Section 3.2).
11 It should be noted that attempts to estimate and explicitly account for the consumption opportu-
nity costs of health care expenditure are particularly limited, even in high-income settings, but do exist
(Claxton et al., 2015b). Although there is currently little evidence in lower income setting to support such
assessment some default assumptions based on what is already known about the relationship between
changes in health and economic growth should be possible.
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Adopting an explicit consumption value of health (vht ) allows the quantifica-
tion and conversion of multiple effects to a common numeraire while reflecting the
opportunity costs of constraints on health care expenditure. This is illustrated in
Table 2b where the net health and consumption effects of the project (columns 5
and 6 of Table 2a) can be expressed as time streams of equivalent health effects
(column 3), discounted at rs − gkh ; equivalent health care resources (column 4),
discounted at rs ; or the equivalent net consumption effects (column 2), discounted
at rc.
12
2.2 The objective of the project is to improve welfare
Traditionally the economic evaluation of social projects (e.g., Boadway & Bruce,
1984) adopts a view of social welfare resting on individual preferences revealed
through markets or modified by an explicit welfare function. BCA is often founded
on this more traditional approach and regards the purpose of any type of project,
including those that require health care resources, as improving a broader notion of
welfare rather than health or other explicitly stated social objectives. This type of
analysis tends to be less well represented in the evaluation of health and medical
care projects, partly due to the difficulty of decision-making bodies being willing to
identify a welfare function carrying some broad consensus, particularly if health is
felt to be unlike other goods (e.g., Broome, 1978; Sen, 1979; Brouwer et al., 2008;
Arrow, 2012). Nevertheless, health must inevitably be traded with other welfare
arguments, most notably consumption, by social planners whilst taking account of
the constraints on health and other public expenditure they face.
BCA reports time streams of benefits and costs as their equivalent consump-
tion values which represent the amount of consumption required to compensate for
the costs of the project and the additional consumption that would be required to
forego the benefits offered. The results of this type of analysis can be reported as
the benefit-cost ratio or net present value of the project. If consumption and health
are the only arguments or are separable from others (Gravelle et al., 2007) then
the time stream of equivalent net consumption effects of the project illustrated in
Table 2b (see column 2) or the equivalent consumption value of the benefits and
12 Converting the time stream health care costs into a time stream of health effects using kht before
valuing them in consumption using Vht and discounting at rc has strong parallels with the shadow price
of capital approach in BCA, where the time stream of any displaced private investment is first converted
into a time stream of consumption losses, which, along with the other direct consumption effects of the
project, are discounted at rc .
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costs of the project illustrated in Table 1 (see columns 8 and 9) are the estimates
required for a BCA of these projects.
Conducting analysis in this extensive way (illustrated in Tables 1, 2a and 2b)
ensures that any changes in the consumption value of health benefits and losses
(Vht ) are already explicitly included in how the time streams of effects have been
valued. Similarly, any expected changes in the health and other opportunity costs of
health care expenditure (kht , kct ) have already been explicitly accounted for in the
time stream of health and consumption effects (see column 2 of Table 2b). Once
all the health and consumption effects of the project are expressed as equivalent
time streams of consumption they can be discounted at a social time preference
rate for consumption (rc). The sum of the discounted time stream of the equivalent
net consumption effects is the net present value of the project.
An alternative to this more extensive approach would be to try and account
for changes in the consumption value of health and the opportunity costs of health
care expenditure through discounting. For example, for the project illustrated in
Table 1, the discount rate for 1ht could be amended to reflect expected growth
in the consumption value of health, gVh , by reducing the discount rate applied to
health benefits (rc − gVh). The discount rate applied to 1cht would also need to
be amended to reflect both growth in the consumption value of health opportunity
losses and any expected growth in a “threshold” that reflects the health opportunity
costs of heath expenditure (rc − gVh + gkh) (Claxton et al., 2011).
13 This differen-
tial or dual discounting implicitly accounts for changes in the value of health and
changes in the marginal productivity of health expenditure as well as time prefer-
ence. This and other forms of dual discounting create potential for confusion and
become more difficult when changes in the consumption opportunity costs of health
care expenditure must be accounted for and when these parameters do not grow at
a constant rate. The separate and explicit accounting for each of these effects illus-
trated in Table 2b would appear more transparent, accountable and comparable.14
How to think about time preference for equivalent consumption effects is well
established and well worked through the Ramsey Rule (rc = δ+ηgc). This includes
pure time preference (δ, i.e., time preference for utility) and a wealth effect (ηgc)
which reflects the relative weight attached to consumption in future compared to the
current period. Individual choices do reveal forms of pure time preference, however,
there are good, albeit disputed, reasons to set revealed pure time preference aside
13 This approximation is based on the plausible assumption that rh , gv and gk are small.
14 The UK Department of Health recommends that health opportunity costs are dealt with explicitly
and separately from discounting. Nonetheless they recommend a discount rate of 1.5% for health and
health care costs and 3.5% for other effects, which embeds the expectation that the consumption value
of health will grow at 2%. This happens to nullify the wealth effect in the UK Treasury social time
preference rate based on the Ramsey Rule.
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when making social choices that will have effects on current and future populations
(Stern, 2008; Nordhaus, 2007; Arrow et al., 2013). The wealth effect in the Ram-
sey Rule requires some assessment of the growth in future consumption (gc) and the
weight that ought to be attached to it (η). This can be cast in a number of ways (e.g.,
based on individual diminishing marginal utility of consumption) and appeal to dif-
ferent forms of evidence (Groom & Maddison, 2018). However, when considering
social choices about projects which have impacts on current and future populations,
it might be best thought of as a form of inequality aversion where expectations of
future growth in consumption means that additional consumption for future ben-
eficiaries should be given less weight than the same additional consumption for
current beneficiaries. The important thing to note is that rc will always be country
specific because even if η is common (and it need not be) rc will be determined by
expectations about future consumption growth which are likely to differ.
2.3 What is the distinction between CEA and BCA?
The explicit assessment of the relative value of other effects shows that the dis-
tinction between a CEA which accounts for wider effects and a BCA which incor-
porates the opportunity of cost or shadow prices of existing constraints is more
apparent than real. Both require the same assessment of the same key parameters in
Tables 2a and 2b. Although much of the applied work to inform decision-making
bodies has adopted a narrower health care system perspective (in part due to a con-
cern for the perceived cost of conflicts with other important social objectives that
are more difficult to fully specify and quantify), a broader ‘societal’ or multisectoral
perspective in CEA is possible and is required and recommended by a number of
decision-making bodies.15
What distinguishes BCA and CEA is a choice of whether social values ought
to reflect those implied by the outcome of legitimate processes (e.g., government
setting budgets for health care) or a notion of welfare founded on individual pref-
erences or an explicit welfare function. For example, the former suggests a social
time preference rate for health of rs − gkh and the latter, rc − gVh . The distinction
15 See Drummond et al. (2015), Section 4.5.3, pp. 112–116. For example National institute for Health
and care Excellence requires a primary analysis from the perspective of the health care system. However,
an analysis that includes other effects can be considered and is required for public health interventions
and programmes. Other decision-making bodies in the Netherlands and Sweden require a broader per-
spective to be adopted as the primary analysis. A societal perspective was recommended as reference
case analysis by the Washington Panel (Gold et al., 1996), alongside a health care system perspective.
The recent update to this guidance (Neumann et al., 2016) recommends analysis from both a societal
and health care system perspective.
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is whether the social value is expressed by kt or Vt and whether it is the opportunity
cost of financing health care or the welfare arguments that underpin the Ramsey
Rule that justify discounting.16
The purpose is not to recommend which choice ought to be made but to clearly
set out the implications for the common parameters that need to be assessed. The
implication for discounting policy, whether conducting BCA or CEA, is that it
becomes even more difficult and opaque to try and embed all these relevant argu-
ments in how health, health care and other costs are discounted. The quantifica-
tion and conversion of the time streams of multiple effects to a common numeraire
(illustrated in Table 2b) avoids embedding multiple arguments in the discount rate
for health and health care costs. For example, when it is believed to be important
to explicitly quantify other impacts beyond measures of health and public health
expenditure it would be appropriate to convert all effects into time streams of their
equivalent consumption gains and losses, while reflecting the opportunity costs of
existing constraints. These time streams of consumption benefits and costs can then
be discounted at a social time preference rate for consumption based on the Ramsey
Rule. The separate and explicit accounting for these arguments allows clarity about
the parameters that need to be assessed, available evidence to be identified and
used transparently and consistently, while preserving the possibility of accountable
deliberation about evidence, values and unquantified arguments in decision-making
processes.
3 Evidence available to inform key parameters
and possible default estimates
The common conceptual framework for CEA and BCA set out in Section 2 iden-
tifies the key parameters that need to be assessed to express the time streams of
effects in a common numeraire of equivalent consumption gains and losses, which
can then be discounted at the social time preference rate for consumption, rc. Each
of these parameters, including rc, are likely to be country specific. As a conse-
quence, the net present value of a project which has effects across a number of
countries will be the sum of the country specific net present values (see Table 4).
16 The actual differences may be modest if gk and gv are similar and the real rate at which government
can borrow is regarded as a reasonable proxy for STPR as some argue it is (Council of Economic
Advisers, 2017).
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3.1 Health opportunity costs of health care expenditure (kht )
The problem of estimating a cost-effectiveness “threshold” that represents expected
health opportunity costs is the same as estimating the relationship between changes
in health care expenditure and health outcome.17 Estimates of the marginal produc-
tivity of health expenditure in producing health (QALYs) are becoming available
for some high-income countries based on approaches to estimation which exploit
within country data (Martin et al., 2008; Claxton et al., 2015a; Vallejo-Torres et al.,
2016; Edney et al., 2018). The proportionate effect on all-cause mortality of propor-
tionate changes in health expenditure (outcome elasticities) has also been estimated
in higher income countries (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016; Edney et al., 2018) using
similar approaches to estimation. Others have used a different approach to identifi-
cation which exploits exogenous elements in how funds are allocated within the UK
National Health Service and have reported similar estimates (Andrews et al., 2017;
Claxton et al., 2018). This evidence from high-income settings can be used to give
some indication of possible values in lower income countries (Woods et al., 2016)
based on a number of assumptions about income elasticity of demand for health and
the relative “under funding” of health care systems. This type of extrapolation sug-
gests that cost per QALY is likely to be less than gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita in middle-income countries and substantially lower in low-income countries.
The effect of different levels of health care expenditure on mortality outcomes
has been investigated in a number of published studies using country level data,
many including LMICs (Gallet & Doucouliagos, 2017). The challenge is to control
for all the other reasons why mortality might differ between countries in order to
isolate the causal effect of differences in health expenditure. This is a particular
challenge even if available measures are complete, accurate and unbiased because
health outcomes are likely to be influenced by expenditure (increases in expenditure
improve outcomes), but outcomes are also likely to influence expenditure (e.g., poor
outcomes may prompt greater efforts and increased expenditure) (Nakamura et al.,
2016). This problem of endogeneity, as well as the inevitable aggregation bias, risks
underestimating the health effects of changes in expenditure.
Instrumental variables have been used in a number of studies to try and over-
come this problem and estimate outcome elasticities for all-cause adult and child
mortality, by gender, as well as survival, disability and DALYs (e.g., Bokhari et al.,
2007). These estimated elasticities have been used to provide country specific cost
per DALY averted values for 123 countries, taking account of measures of a coun-
try’s infrastructure, donor funding, population distribution, mortality rates, condi-
tional life expectancies (all by age and gender), estimates of disability burden of
17 See Drummond et al. (2015), Section 4.3, pp. 83–94; Section 4.3.3.1, pp. 95–95.
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disease and total health care expenditure (Ochalek et al., 2015). These estimates
have recently been updated (Ochalek et al., 2018) and work is underway to assess
how cost per DALY averted is likely to evolve with changes in health care expen-
diture and consumption growth.
There are considerable estimation challenges even in high-income settings
where good quality data are more readily available. A particular challenge is to
find suitable and valid instruments to overcome the problem of endogeneity. This,
combined with the risk of aggregation bias and incomplete data, makes estimates
based on country level data particularly uncertain.
Possible default estimates (kht )
Some initial quantitative judgement about the likely health opportunity costs
and how they may evolve is unavoidable whether conducting CEA or BCA. These
judgements could be informed by current initial estimates in LMICs. However, the
framework of analysis in Ochalek et al. (2018) can be applied to the results of
any study thought to identify a more plausible effect on mortality of changes in
health expenditure, whether they are based on country level or within country data.
Any initial country specific default estimates can be refined and updated as other
estimates emerge, ideally using within country data where this is possible.
3.2 Consumption opportunity costs of health care
expenditure (kct)
The consumption opportunity costs associated with health care expenditure require
either direct evidence of the impact of changes on health care expenditure on net
production (i.e., the value of additional production net of additional consumption)
or estimates of the impact that changes in health are likely to have on net production
in the rest of the economy (which with evidence from 3.1 the former can be derived
from the latter).
Attempts to estimate and explicitly account for these nonhealth opportunity
costs of health expenditure are particularly limited, even in high-income settings,
but do exist.18 There are no explicit estimates for other countries, but a wide litera-
ture already exists at a microlevel (e.g., health and labour market outcomes) and at
18 For example, as part of efforts to inform value based pricing of branded medicines the UK Depart-
ment of Health undertook work to estimate the “wider social benefits” associated with changes in health
outcome which could be linked to evidence of health opportunity costs to estimate the net production
opportunity costs of changes in health expenditure. The evidence in the UK suggests that a marginal
pound in the NHS budget provides 92p worth of net production gains (see Appendix B of Claxton et al.,
2015b).
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a macrolevel (e.g., health and economic growth) that could be marshalled to derive
estimates of the likely productive effects of changes in health relevant to different
settings. These types of estimates could provide some default assessment of the net
production effects likely to be associated with the particular type of health bene-
fits offered by a project. Importantly, they can also be linked to evidence of health
opportunity costs in 3.1 to estimate the consumption opportunity costs of health
care expenditure.
Possible default estimates (kct )
In the absence of marshalling existing but disparate evidence, a default assump-
tion of 1 (1 dollar spent on health care delivers 1 dollar in net production or con-
sumption opportunities) might be a reasonable, albeit conservative, assumption in
LMIC settings given the very limited evidence currently available. Although there
is little evidence about how this aspect of opportunity costs is likely to evolve, a
default assumption that the real value of the net production effects of the health
effects of changes in health expenditure will grow at the same rate as consumption
may not be unreasonable.
3.3 Consumption value of health and its evolution over time
(Vht )
There is a large literature which has used stated preferences (contingent valuation
and discrete choice experiments) to estimate the consumption value or willingness
to pay for a measured improvement in health (QALYs gained) (e.g., Pinto-Prades
et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2009). Recent reviews of this literature reveal wide vari-
ation in values (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016; Ryen & Svensson, 2015; Thokala et al.,
2018). These estimates reflect the demand for health, rather than a “supply side”
assessment of health opportunity costs. Most estimate how much consumption an
individual is willing to give up to improve their own health. A few try to elicit how
much individuals believe society should pay to improve health more generally. A
wider literature, that extends beyond health, estimates the value per statistical life
(VSL) based on how much consumption individuals are willing to give up to reduce
their mortality risk (Hammitt, 2000; Robinson et al., 2016, 2019). Some studies are
based on stated preferences but others identify situations where individuals make
choices that imply a value, e.g., revealed preferences in the labour market. There
are relatively few studies of willingness to pay for nonfatal risk reductions (Robin-
son & Hammitt, 2018). Nonetheless, a cost per DALY can be derived from VSL
studies based on the age and gender distribution, conditional life expectancies and
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quality of life norms. However, this requires strong assumptions that are unlikely
to reflect individual preferences (Robinson & Hammitt, 2018).19
Most of this literature reports values relevant to high-income countries. How-
ever, some patterns that emerge are also likely to be relevant to LMICs: estimates
based on VSL studies tend to be higher than those based on willingness to pay for
a QALY gained; values are not proportional to the scale of health gains and dif-
fer depending on whether health gains are through quality improvement or survival
benefits (Robinson & Hammitt, 2018; Robinson et al., 2019).20
Although there is limited direct empirical evidence which provides values in
lower income settings, there is some evidence about how values differ with income,
which might be used to extrapolate from high to low-income settings (Hammitt,
2017; Robinson et al., 2019). However, adjusting for income is only one of a num-
ber of factors that are likely to influence values (Hammitt, 2017). Reviews of the
literature that have investigated the relationship between the VSL and income (e.g.,
Hammitt & Robinson, 2011; Viscusi & Masterman, 2017; Masterman & Viscusi,
2018; Robinson et al., 2019) suggest that the consumption value of health increases
with income and that an income elasticity of 1 would not be unreasonable (Mas-
terman & Viscusi, 2018). However, the income elasticity for fatal and nonfatal risk
reductions is likely to differ (Robinson & Hammitt, 2018; Robinson et al., 2019).
Therefore, income elasticities from VLS studies may not fully reflect how the con-
sumption value of a QALY gained or DALY averted changes with income.
Possible default estimates (Vht )
A simple but reasonable assessment of how Vht is likely to evolve could be
based on growth in consumption (which is already required and embedded in the
19 It should be noted that there are good reasons to suppose that Vh ·1h will not fully reflect individual
welfare when Vh is some population average and 1h has not measured all dimensions of outcome that
are of value to the individual and/or where multiple dimensions have been combined imposing assump-
tions that do not reflect individual preferences (e.g., QALY and DALY). As a consequence measures of
willingness to pay for a unit change in a measure of health may not reflect an individual’s willingness to
pay for the prospect of effects across many dimensions of outcome, some of which may not have been
measured. Similarly VSL studies estimate the willingness to pay for a change in a particular type of
risk which is likely to differ by the level of risk faced the scale of the change in risk. Finally, individual
willingness to pay will differ across individuals, so adopting a particular average value for the popula-
tion (e.g., at average income) is unlikely to reflect the welfare effects for this population. Nonetheless,
estimates of the health effects of projects (e.g., mortality, survival, morbidity, DALY, QALY) are more
likely to be available than individual willingness to pay for the prospect of effects the project offers.
Similarly the opportunity costs of health expenditure are more easily approximated by Vh(1ch/kh)
than willingness to pay for the prospect of effects of a change in health expenditure might offer. For
these reasons estimates of the willingness to pay for measured health effects are useful, even though all
aspects of individual welfare may not be fully reflected in Vh ·1h .
20 A problem of insensitivity to scale in stated preference studies is not restricted to health but can
occur in the valuation of other attributes such as environmental quality.
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wealth effect of the Ramsey Rule) and assumptions about the income elasticity
of demand for health. An income elasticity of demand for health of 1 might be a
reasonable, albeit conservative, default assumption in which case Vht would grow
at the same rate as consumption. This could be compared with a less conservative
scenario based upon an income elasticity of 1.5. Other scenarios could be justified
based on evidence that income elasticity is likely to differ in particular settings.
3.4 Other constrained sectors (Vxt/kxt)
Health expenditure is not the only category of public expenditure which is con-
strained. Therefore, the effects of a project on other types of public expenditure
ought to reflect their opportunity costs in the same way as health expenditure. One
way to do this is to use the evidence that is available for the health sector to shadow
price other forms of public expenditure. Estimates of the consumption value of
health tend to be higher than available estimates of a “supply side” assessment of
health opportunity costs (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016). This suggests a common dis-
crepancy between the demand and supply side of health care systems. For example,
if these estimates are regarded as an appropriate expression of social value, the
difference between Vht and kht would indicate that health care from collectively
pooled resources is ‘underfunded’ compared to individual preferences about health
and consumption.21 It is consistent with the view that the public funding of health
care is not matching individual preferences and public expectations of their health
care system. However, given the difficulties faced in the public financing of health
care, and the welfare losses associated with socially acceptable means of taxation,
this is what might be expected and especially so in lower income settings where the
difficulties of public financing are more acute.22 The balance of evidence suggests
that Vht/kht > 1. This ratio is the shadow price for public health expenditure, i.e.,
21 For example, the UK DH has adopted £15,000 per QALY to assess health opportunity costs and
until recently £60,000 per QALY as an estimate of the consumption value of health based on deriving
QALY effects from VSL estimates. This would suggest that one health care pound is worth 4 pounds
of private consumption effects, which is especially important when there are other impacts which fall
outside constrained public expenditure.
22 The welfare losses associated with socially acceptable ways to raise public finance means there is
a marginal cost of public funds, i.e., it costs more than one private dollar to raise one public dollar.
Estimates of the marginal cost of public funds of 1.3 to 1.5 are not unreasonable (e.g., Ruggeri, 1999;
Dahlby, 2008) and suggest it is unlikely that public health expenditure should be increased to the point
where kht = Vht .
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the value of one public health dollar relative to one private consumption dollar.23
Therefore, estimates of Vht and kht , which are already required, could also be used
to shadow price other forms of public expenditure.
Possible default estimates (Vxt/kxt )
Estimates of Vht/kht in the health sector might be used to shadow price other
forms of public expenditure (where the equivalent estimates for that sector are
absent) since resource allocation and expenditure decisions by government and
other ministries would be expected to equalize this ratio across sectors (x) given
an overall constraint on total public expenditure, i.e., it may not be unreasonable to
assume Vht/kht = Vxt/kxt when considering impacts on public sector x .
3.5 Time preference for consumption (rc)
A social time preference rate for consumption based on the Ramsey Rule (rc =
δ + ηgc) includes pure time preference (δ) and a wealth effect (ηgc) which was
discussed in Section 2.2. Pure time preference rates of 0–1% could be regarded
as reasonable (Drupp et al., 2018), however, whether or not a revealed pure time
preference should be set aside when considering projects with intergenerational
effects turns on disputed ethical questions.24 The wealth effect in the Ramsey Rule
reflects an assessment of the expected growth in consumption (gc) and the weight
that ought to be attached to consumption in the future compared to the current
period (η).
There is some revealed preference evidence to inform η in high-income coun-
tries (Groom & Maddison, 2018), and some empirical evidence drawn from a sur-
vey of expert opinion on long term decision-making (Drupp et al., 2018). However,
the balance of this evidence in high-income settings suggests that there is some
element of inequality aversion with values of 1 < η < 2 not being unreasonable
(Groom & Maddison, 2018). There are also possibilities of obtaining revealed val-
ues for η through other social choices (e.g., the progressivity of tax and benefit
systems) (Evans & Sezer, 2002). Such concerns for intra- as well as intertempo-
ral equity could lead to a focus on inequality adjusted growth such as using the
growth rate of the median household rather than the mean per capita growth rate to
23 This shadow price will be higher if improvements in health also have positive consumption effects
because the value of additional public health expenditure includes the health effects of expenditure (kh)
valued at Vh , plus the consumption effects of health expenditure (kc).
24 For example, if it is regarded as unethical to treat people differently only because they happen to
appear at different points in time then pure time preference could be set aside on the grounds of impartial
utilitarianism.
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estimate rc (Emmerling et al., 2017). Little direct evidence of η exists for LMICs;
nonetheless country specific default estimates of rc are possible because even if η
is common (and it need not be) it will be determined by expectations about eco-
nomic growth which are likely to differ between countries with different expecta-
tions about economic growth.
Possible default estimates
A conservative default assumption to establish country specific estimates of
rc would be to apply η = 1 to available estimates of gc (reported as expected
growth in measures of national income per capita for that country), i.e., the discount
rate applied to time streams of equivalent consumption effects is gc. This could
be compared with a less conservative scenario based on η = 2, where rc would
be twice the expected growth in consumption. Other scenarios could be justified
based on evidence or reasoning of why η is likely to differ in specific contexts
or based on different judgements about the prospects of future economic growth by
social planners. As evidence for values of η specific to LMICs evolves and estimates
of economic growth are revised these defaults can be updated. This can also be
compared to a wealth effect based on expected growth in median income where
those are available.
3.6 Catastrophic, macroeconomic and project specific risk
Catastrophic risk
Truly catastrophic risk is best thought of as the probability of an event that rep-
resents total catastrophe for the whole of society so those who were to receive the
welfare effects of a public policy or programme no longer exist. When cast in this
way it excludes events which could be described as ‘catastrophic’ but where some
recovery might be possible even if this requires assistance from others (other coun-
tries, global bodies). This is important, as although a ‘catastrophic’ event where
recovery is possible may have a major impact on growth and whether the payoffs
from particular projects are realized, these impacts are unlikely to be the same for
all projects. Therefore, these types of ‘catastrophic’ but recoverable risks are best
included in how macroeconomic risk and project specific risks are accounted for
rather than being embedded in a common adjustment to the discount rate for all
projects.
There are sources for probabilities of truly catastrophic events where recov-
ery would not be possible (Chapman, 2004; Stern, 2007). The probabilities are
relatively small and if included would add little to a common discount rate for
consumption effects. Given the other more influential sources of uncertainty in
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specifying reasonable default values for a common discount rate for consumption
affects it might be reasonable to set aside truly catastrophic risks. If catastrophic
risk is included, it should be based on an estimate of the probabilities of truly catas-
trophic events where recovery would not be possible (60.1%).
Macroeconomic risk
When all effects of a project are expressed as streams of consumption bene-
fits and costs then discounting using the social time preference rate for consump-
tion (rc) would be appropriate. When project net benefits are uncorrelated with the
macroeconomy (aggregate consumption growth), some decline in rc over longer
time horizons will be needed due to persistent uncertainty in the consumption
growth element of the wealth effect of the Ramsey Rule (Arrow et al., 2013; Crop-
per et al., 2014; Freeman & Groom, 2016; Freeman et al., 2015). In essence the
declining term structure of discount rates reflects a societal demand for precau-
tionary saving and is an expression of prudence: saving for a rainy day induced
by macroeconomic downturns. The impact on net present values is modest over
shorter terms but is more significant when there is greater uncertainty about eco-
nomic growth. A similar effect on rc occurs when there is a risk of low probability
but significant shocks (Barro, 2009; Gollier, 2014).
The time horizons for the evaluation of many projects with health effects are
often less than 30 years or generally do not extend much beyond that. For example,
insofar as a project impacts mortality risk, the time horizon for costs and benefits
may only extend to the survival of the cohort of current beneficiaries. However,
projects that change the dynamics of infectious disease and/or require commitment
of irrecoverable costs also require an assessment over the survival of future incident
cohorts that will be affected or will benefit from the investment.
Therefore, the use of rc without adjustment for macroeconomic risk may be a
reasonable default assumption for projects with time horizons less than 30 years.
Where there are longer time horizons, or where macroeconomic risk is greater and
increases more rapidly with term (as is more likely in LMICs), declining rates might
be required but should be based on uncertainty in consumption growth rather than
behavioural evidence of time preference. Since growth and uncertainty about that
growth will be country specific, any decline in rc will also be country specific.
Project specific risk
Considerable efforts have been made in the evaluation of health projects to
characterize all sources of uncertainty, value the consequences and establish how
these should inform project choice, e.g., whether the approval should be delayed
until further research is conducted or until sources of uncertainty resolve over time.
The impact of irrecoverable costs and the real option value of delay have been
examined, as well as the impact of approval on the opportunities to acquire evidence
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that would benefit future patient populations (Drummond et al., 2015, Chapter 11).
This type of analysis starts to unpack the reasons for the appearance of risk aversion
in project choice.
Some project evaluations may have already accounted for the consequences of
some project specific risks in ways that others may not. In any event, these risks and
their consequences necessarily differ by project so should certainly not be embed-
ded in a common discount rate for the consumption effects. Therefore, where pos-
sible, project specific risks should be included in how the expected time streams of
consumption equivalent effects of the project are estimated. If these risks have been
accounted for in this way it could be argued that they can be discounted at a risk free
rate (Arrow & Lind, 1970) and no project specific risk premium would be required.
This would be reasonable if government or other funders of the project can diversify
risk (e.g., across many taxpayers) and that project specific risks are uncorrelated
with those in the wider economy. If they are correlated then a project specific risk
premium may be required to account for the interaction between project specific
and macroeconomic risk (Baumstark & Gollier, 2014).
This interaction is not often considered in the evaluation of social projects but
is a well-established feature of how capital assets are priced. The parallel for social
projects is to consider the relationship between the uncertainty in the project’s pay-
offs and uncertainty in future macroeconomic conditions. For example, a project
with payoffs that are countercyclical (provides greater than expected payoffs when
growth and consumption is lower than expected) is more valuable than a project
with the same expected payoffs, but which offers procyclical risks (offers poorer
than expected outcomes when growth is lower than expected).
This can be reflected in a project specific risk premium (beta) which depends
on the correlation between project payoffs and realized consumption growth, i.e.,
the project specific discount rate will be higher than rc when the correlation is
positive (beta > 0) and lower than rc when it is negative (beta < 0), whether
or not rc has been adjusted for macroeconomic risk (Gollier, 2012). This also has
implications for how the discount rate changes with term due to macroeconomic
risk. For example, although rates will decline for a risk free project (beta = 0),
they may increase with term for projects that are strongly procyclical (beta > 0) and
increase more quickly with greater uncertainty in economic growth. The magnitude
of these effects also depends on how any correlation tends to be concentrated. For
example, if it is concentrated in low probability but high impact events, such as a
severe fall in consumption, the risk premium will be highly positive or negative,
which can significantly reduce or increase the value of the project (Barro, 2009).
This may be especially important in LMIC settings, where uncertainty about
economic growth and the possibility of low probability but high impact events
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may be higher than in high-income countries. Uncertainty about the outcomes of
projects in LMICs might also be greater and more strongly correlated with macroe-
conomic risk. Therefore, an important question is whether a project is likely to be
pro- or countercyclical and whether any correlation is concentrated in low proba-
bility high impact events. For example, the present value of a project which is likely
to offer greater payoffs in times of war, economic crisis or severe epidemic will be
substantially higher than indicated by discounting at rc. In the absence of estab-
lished estimates of betas for health projects and a lack of experience in the field
in estimating them, a qualitative indication of whether or not projects are likely to
be strongly pro- or countercyclical and how these cyclical effects are likely to be
concentrated would be a useful starting point for deliberation by decision makers,
while further research is conducted on how the effects of these interactions might
be best quantified for these types of project relevant to LMICs.
4 Recommendations, reporting and further
research
4.1 Summary of possible estimates and default
assumptions
The possible estimates and default assumptions for the parameters identified in
Section 2 and discussed in Section 3, are summarized in Table 3.
These parameters, which are common to CEA and BCA, depend, directly or
indirectly, on expectations about the growth in consumption. For example, rc and
growth in the consumption value of health both depend directly on gc. The change
in health and other opportunity costs associated with health care expenditure will
also, in part, be determined by expectations about economic growth. The relative
value of impacts on different dimensions of health outcome (morbidity and mor-
tality) is also likely to be country specific and will change with economic growth.
This has two implications. First, since gc will be country specific, all these parame-
ters will also be country specific, including rc, which has important implications for
aggregating effects of a project that is relevant to a number of different jurisdictions
(see Section 4.2). Second, it is important than any assessment of gc is consistently
applied to inform all the key parameters that depend on it, so that any change in
these expectations, or any alternative judgements about gc, feeds through into all
the relevant parameters and is used consistently throughout.
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Table 3 Key parameters and possible estimates and default assumptions.
Key parameters Possible estimates and default assumptions
Health opportunity costs of
health care expenditure in
each period (t)
kht • Estimates reported in Ochalek et al. (2018) could
provide initial default estimates of cost per DALY
averted
• Projections of these estimates based on estimates of
health expenditure and consumption growth are
possible
• These initial estimates can be refined and updated as
other country specific estimates emerge
Consumption opportunity
costs of health care
expenditure in each period (t)
kct • A conservative default assumption of 1 (1 dollar spent
on health care delivers 1 dollar in net production)
• A conservative default assumption that the real value
of the net production effects will grow at the same rate
as consumption
Consumption value of health
in each period (t)
vht • Country specific estimates of Vht , see Robinson et al.
(2019) and Robinson and Hammitt (2018)
• Growth in Vht can be based on growth in
consumption (gc) and the income elasticity of demand
for health
• A conservative scenario using an income elasticity of
demand for health of 1 (Vht will grow at gc)
• Scenario using an income elasticity of demand of 1.5
Opportunity costs for other
sectors (x) in each period (t)
vxt/kxt • Default assumption that vht/kht = vxt/kxt when
considering impacts on other public sectors
Social rate of time preference
for consumption
rc • A normative assumption of zero pure time preference
for social choices is not unreasonable (δ = 0)
• Two scenarios based on alternative assumptions of
inequality aversion can be used
• A conservative scenario based on
η = 1 (rc = gc)
• Alternative scenario based on
η = 2 (rc = 2gc)
• Other scenarios can be based on evidence of why η is
likely to differ in specific contexts or different
judgements about gc
Catastrophic risk • If catastrophic risk is included it should be based an
estimate of the probability of truly catastrophic events
where recovery would not be possible (60.1%)
Continued on next page.
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Table 3 (Continued).
Macroeconomic risk • Use of rc without adjustment for macroeconomic risk
may be a reasonable for projects with shorter time
horizons (<30 years)
• For longer time horizons or where macroeconomic
risk is greater, declining rates may be required but
should be based on uncertainty in consumption growth
Project specific risk • Where possible project specific risks should be
included in how the time streams of consumption
equivalent effects of the project are estimated
• A qualitative indication of whether projects are likely
to be strongly pro or counter cyclical should be
provided
• Further research is required on how the interaction of
project specific and macroeconomic risk might be best
quantified for the types of project relevant to LMICs
4.2 Reporting and aggregating effects
Extensive reporting is recommended, as illustrated in Tables 1, 2a and 2b. Reporting
the results of CEA and BCA in this way makes explicit the assessments required.
This enables the impact of alternative, but plausible, assumptions to be explored
and analysis to be updated as better estimates evolve. The quantification and con-
version of the time streams of effects into their equivalent health, health care cost or
consumption effects avoids embedding multiple arguments in discounting policies.
The separate and explicit accounting for these arguments provides clarity about
the parameters that need to be assessed, available evidence to be identified and
used transparently and consistently, while preserving the possibility of accountable
deliberation about evidence, values and unquantified arguments in decision-making
processes.
Some projects and supranational investments will have effects across different
counties where all these key parameters will differ, e.g., when global bodies make
recommendations, purchase health technologies, or prioritize the development of
new ones. Other projects and national investments will have effects across jurisdic-
tions (e.g., states or provinces) within a particular country where only some of these
parameters differ (e.g., kht ). Therefore, the net present value of a project which has
effects across a number of countries will be the sum of the country specific net
present values rather than the sum of effects across countries discounted at some
common rate. This is illustrated in Table 4 for a project with effects on health,
health care costs and consumption in three countries or jurisdictions (A, B and C).
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Table 4 Reporting the effects of a project with impacts on more than one jurisdiction.
Equivalent consumption effects across countries or jurisdictions
Country A Country B Country C
Net present value
∑T
t=1
vA
h,t

1hAt − 1c
A
h,t
k A
h,t

− [1cAc,t + k Ac,t ·1cAh,t ]
(1+r Ac )
t
∑T
t=1
vB
h,t

1hBt − 1c
B
h,t
kB
h,t

− [1cBc,t + kBc,t ·1cBh,t ]
(1+r Bc )
t
∑T
t=1
vc
h,t
[
1hct −
1cc
h,t
kc
h,t
]
− [1ccc,t + k
c
c,t ·1c
c
h,t
]
(1+rcc )
t
Global net present value
∑T
t=1
vA
h,t

1hAt − 1c
A
h,t
k A
h,t

− [1cAc,t + k Ac,t ·1cAh,t ]
(1+r Ac )
t
+
∑T
t=1
vB
h,t

1hBt − 1c
B
h,t
kB
h,t

− [1cBc,t + kBc,t ·1cBh,t ]
(1+r Bc )
t
+
∑T
t=1
vc
h,t
[
1hct −
1cc
h,t
kc
h,t
]
− [1ccc,t + k
c
c,t ·1c
c
h,t
]
(1+rcc )
t
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The country specific effects must be transformed into country specific time streams
of equivalent consumption and then discounted at the country specific rate for con-
sumption. The country specific Net Present Values (NPV) can then be summed to
indicate the global NPV of a project with effects in a number of countries.
4.3 Suggestions for further research
An initial quantitative assessment of health opportunity costs and how they are
likely to evolve is possible based on the balance of evidence from studies using
country level data. Projections of these estimates can be linked to expectations of
consumption growth which determines the social time preference rate and growth
in the consumption value of health. More recent estimates of the health effects of
changes in health care expenditure suggest that larger effects tend to be identified
when using within country data and especially at a disease area level. Therefore,
extending the estimation of outcome elasticities using within country data to more
health care systems would be particularly valuable. Attempts to estimate the con-
sumption opportunity cost of health expenditure are particularly limited. Nonethe-
less, a wide literature already exists at a microlevel (e.g., health and labour market
outcomes) and at a macrolevel (e.g., health and economic growth) which could be
marshalled to derive estimates of the likely productive effects of changes in health
relevant to different settings.
Estimates of country specific expected growth in consumption are available and
can inform a number of parameters, including rc. However, measures of inequality
adjusted growth such as the difference in the growth of median and mean income
are not readily available for LMICs. There is little direct evidence to inform the
weight that might be attached to future compared to current consumption (η) for
LMICs. There are, however, possibilities of obtaining revealed values for η through
other social choices (e.g., the progressivity of tax and benefit systems). The evi-
dence to support estimates of the consumption value of health in particular LMICs
and income elasticities of demand for health are considered in more detail in Robin-
son and Hammitt (2018) and Robinson et al. (2019).
The use of rc without adjustment for increasing uncertainty about future con-
sumption may be a reasonable default assumption for projects with shorter time
horizons. However, a review of estimates of gc relevant to LMICs could identify
the circumstances where declining rates should be applied. This could be used to
develop tools which would provide appropriate declining rates for rc based on gc,
measures of uncertainty in gc by term, η and an initial assumption of beta = 0.
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Whether projects are likely to be pro-, or countercyclical is not often considered
in the evaluation of social projects and there is a lack of experience of estimating
this type of risk premium (betas) for the types of projects considered in LMICs.
Therefore, a first step would be to illustrate, with case studies, how a qualitative
indication of whether or not projects are likely to be strongly pro-, or countercycli-
cal might be made and how these correlations are likely to be concentrated. This
might also identify the characteristics of projects and circumstances where quanti-
fying the interaction of project and macroeconomic risk is likely to be particularly
important in project choice and how betas might be estimated for these types of
project.
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